I. Introduction

Political polarization is not a characterization of only the Diaspora Oromo. Established democracies of the West also suffer from the problem. A recent study by Cameron (2002) captured the challenges that this problem presents (including the opportunities it offers) the US presidency. Cameron 2002 (647) uses the term "polarized politics" as a reference to "… the politics of periods when elites … resemble two armed camps at the ends of the American ideological spectrum". Polarization, according to Duclos et al. 2004 (1737), "… is related to the alienation that individuals and groups feel from one another". With reference to political polarization affecting the US presidency, Cameron (2002: 647) argues that the condition occurs "… when politics is polarized and control of government is divided by party". Polarized presidency, according to the assessment of Cameron 2002(647), is marked by two 'defining conditions': (1) 'polarized elites' and (2) 'divided party government'. The author argues that "The impeachment of President Clinton, the hyperbolically partisan language and displays on Capitol Hill, the vituperative tone of dissents in Supreme Court opinions, the mud-flinging displays on media political talk shows, the snide and nasty language in best-selling political journalism", are all a manifestation that "American political elites have polarized ideologically to a truly remarkable degree" (Cameron 2002:648).

The key lesson that emerges from Cameron's study (see Cameron 2002), [as affects the current OSA episode], is not why political polarization occurs intra and inter-groups per se but rather why we need to be aware that the condition is both a reality [of our time] and of profound consequences [for institutions in general] (see Cameron 2002: 654). Further lesson that emerges from the study relates to the multiplying consequences that political polarization entails when intra and inter-group schism is combined with grassroots polarization.

Between the middle of 1996 and the beginning of 1998 OSA had experienced some form of polarization between personalities both within and outside the institution. However, because grassroots polarization (i.e., among the Diaspora Oromo), in general, and voter polarization (i.e., OSA financial members), in particular, was negligible, OSA was quick to overcome the problem and return to what it does best. The situation since the late 1990s is different; the split of the OLF top leadership ushered in an era of what I call 'grassroots polarization' among the Diaspora Oromo. This produced a totally different social and political dynamic among the Diaspora Oromo.

The current OSA episode provides an objective tool through which we can look at our political self and seek to accept the ideological differences that exist among us, and, for better or for worse, to allow some latitude for those whose choices might be different to ours. If we fail in this most fundamental test, we shall fall in the same trap as the trio who preferred to think that the Diaspora Oromo are oblivious to the political views that split the OSA BD vote of 2006. Cameron's study (see Cameron 2002: 654) showed us that political polarization among elites carries enormous consequences for institutions. What would Cameron (2002) have observed from a scenario (such as the OSA 2006 BD dynamic) where political polarization (among elites) is mixed with the 'winner takes it all' contest?

The interaction of political polarization and 'the winner takes it all' contest, in my assessment, offers an accurate explanation for the phenomenon that Drs Caaltu Dheressa and Bahiru Gametchu and Mr. Abraham Mosisa (henceforth Dheressa et al. 2006) have brought to our attention. If we are brave enough to accept this diagnosis, the challenge for the Diaspora Oromo becomes whether we should allow the phenomenon to fuel an escalation of crisis of political polarization among the Diaspora Oromo or whether we should use it as an opportunity to regroup as voices of the voiceless and march in unison toward our call of helping to rid our beloved Oromia of the repressive government of Prime Minister Zenawi.

The overarching objective of this brief paper is to introduce reality lenses to the series of emails that the paper authored by Dheressa et al. (2006) has provoked from a number of Oromos recently. I shall argue that at the centre of the problem that the paper reported is a polarization of political positions that is made worse by 'the winner takes it all' contest. I shall utilize the following tools to develop my argument. I shall examine: 1) the evidence for consistency of neutrality; 2) the relevance of political polarization among Oromo Diaspora on the dynamic of OSA Board Room; 3) the procedures followed, hypothetical it may be, in accessing internal OSA BDs' correspondence for perception or otherwise of underlying prejudice, and; 4) call for a commonsense to prevail on which to collectively use OSA's historical gains toward nation-building efforts rather than allowing the escalation of crisis of political polarization among the Diaspora Oromos that has been taking place for a long time.

The need for a militant call for reform needs to be balanced between the extent of systemic failure, on the one hand, and the extent to which the ensuing process impacts public interest, on the other. To the extent that this balance needs to be maintained thus the selection of jurisdiction for adjudication of the competing views and the language used for construction of the evidence are critical. The jurisdiction that Dheressa et al. (2006) have selected and the language that they have used to construct the evidence (including the responses that they provoked from those who have rallied behind the authors' call) erode and do not enhance the interest of the Oromo public. I shall argue in this reflection that the failure on the part of Dheressa et al. (2006) to have given this important balance due regard and their conscious pursuit of ego-driven point-scoring means that what is at stake presently is bigger than OSA - the institution - itself.

II. The 'winner takes it all' contest

The 'winner takes it all' contest is an approach or principle applied in negotiation with a stern 'take it or leave it' attitude. In politically divided context, such an approach does not create peace. To the contrary, it breeds intractable conflicts. Crick (1990:269) noted, for example, "My moral is not peace at any price but the terribly high price and unpredictability of victory if it comes to winner takes it all." Where politically divided groups deliberately work against the application the principle of the 'winner takes it all' contest [holding all other factors constant], peace thrives. The evidence for this is, respectively, the political fields of African countries and the similarly ethnically and culturally diverse countries of the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium (see Branco 2006:66). It is to the very principle of the 'winner takes it all' contest that that the failure of democratic reform in ethnically and culturally diverse African countries is attributed (see Branco 2006:66). It is also to the deliberate departure from this principle, and consequently to the introduction of 'consociative democracy', that the success of democratic systems and economic development in these three European countries is attributed (see Branco 2006:66).

III. Political polarization and 'the winner takes it all' contest

The introductory section of this paper established that political polarization (both within and between groups) is a reality [of today's era] with substantial consequences on institutions. The same section also established that it is when political polarization combines with other forces (e.g. grassroots polarization) that the consequences become critical. When political polarization combines, beyond grassroots polarization, with such recalcitrant sentiments as the 'winner takes it all' contest, intra and inter-group crisis further escalates.

With this background in mind, is it fair to expect a total absence of divergence of political affiliation among past and present OSA officials when there is an apparent political polarization among the Diaspora Oromo? Can the three OSA BDs who the authors alleged did not vote for Oboo Leenco Latta be expected/believed to have a value-free (i.e., a complete political neutrality) approach to the agenda of nomination and selection of the awardees of OSA 2006? Can Dheressa et al. (2006), themselves be expected/believed to have a value-free approach to the agenda of nomination and selection of the awardees of OSA 2006? What does a test of consistency of the authors' evidence show? Does unauthorized divulgence of internal OSA BDs' communication to protesters who cannot be seen to be disinterested indicate or otherwise the existence of underlying prejudice within the OSA BDs? Is the evidence of Dheressa et al. (2006) admissible for adjudication of the OSA BDs conflict in the public court? Or does the evidence (and its mode of access) paint a more sinister machination - i.e., 'the winner takes it all' contest - that failed to materialize? It is thus the case of 'if you can't convict, you must acquit'?

1. The relevance of political polarization among Oromo Diaspora to the dynamic of OSA Board Room

In the case of the Diaspora Oromo, it is a public secret that the split of the OLF top leadership that seemed only transitory a few years ago has now become almost intractable. This, as observed earlier, has infected members of the Diaspora Oromo. Whilst OSA as an Oromo scholarly institution may exist outside the domain of Oromo politics, its leaders cannot be asked to remain completely value-free about the direction that Oromo politics takes at any one given time.

2. The consistency of neutrality in Dheressa et al. (2006) evidence

Dheressa et al. (2006) are fully aware that 'complete neutrality' is an important criterion that they have to satisfy for a successful prosecution of their charge against the accused. It is for this reason that the authors have found it important to assure the reader that they "… have no personal stake whatsoever" in the matter. The assurance of the authors needs to be tested for consistency.

Test one: language as a mirror of neutrality or prejudice

In crafting their evidence, Dheressa et al. (2006) have included a disclaimer that states that they are a disinterested party. In section B of their evidence (see Election of officers'), however, the authors have argued that "The business meeting was fraught with preplanned schemes to justify the end, i.e. designed for the take-over of OSA by a faction whose aims will only bring damage on the organization." Which 'faction' are Dheressa et al. (2006) referring to?

My own bias interprets this to mean a group that supports the current OLF leadership (who Obbo Lenco Latta reported to serve as an advisor). If this is the case, by any standard measure, this assertion does not attest neutrality. The assertion shows very clearly that whilst they claim complete neutrality, in fact, the authors' own political position has made it impossible for them remain fully objective. Despite claiming to "… have no personal stake whatsoever" in the matter under contention (i.e., about the outcome of the OSA 2006 BD decision) Dheressa et al. (2006) may have withheld their true intention. In their evidence, the authors have stated their objective is simply to "… ask the reader to weigh [her/his] concerns and [to] arrive at [his/her] own conclusion". I argue that to ask the critical reader to accept their notion of complete neutrality in the matter under contention is unfair, to say the least. To grant the authors what they have asked is equally unfair, if not naive.

Test two: the divulgence of BDs' internal communication to Dheressa et al. (2006): a test of perception of underlying prejudice Dheressa et al. (2006) did not disclose the procedures that they followed to access internal email communications among the OSA BDs which they presented as evidence. It seems plausible, given the strong common grounds stood by Dheressa et al. (2006) and the three BDs on the subject of Oboo Leenco Latta's selection for the OSA 2006 award, that there is 'behind the scene' communication between at least one of the three OSA BDs and Dheressa et al. (2006). It is also plausible to deduce, given no authoritative body, according to public knowledge, has legally sought and obtained the evidentiary materials from the three BDs, that the materials were obtained clandestinely by Dheressa et al. (2006) from at least one member of the three BDs who were opposed to the selection of Oboo Leenco Latta for the award. If the above assumptions hold, then it is plausible to conclude that the three BDs that were opposed to the selection of Oboo Leenco Latta for the award colluded to maximize their political interests by, first, opposing to the selection of Oboo Leenco Latta for the award, and by, second, clandestinely divulging internal BDs' communication. If this assumption holds, it is then plausible to deduce that it is the mixture of political polarization and the 'winner takes it all' contest that has fuelled the latest OSA episode.

3. The admissibility of the evidence

Test One and Test Two (see above) show strong plausibility of the following critical elements:a. It is impossible to rule out, beyond reasonable doubt, that the three BDs who were opposed to the selection Oboo Leenco Latta for the OSA 2006 award colluded to reach this decision on grounds of political prejudice against the candidate.b. The failure of the three BDs to preclude Oboo Leenco Latta from the award constituted their failure in the 'winner takes it all' contest.c. The divulgence, clandestinely (unless otherwise stated by either the three BDs or by Dheressa et al. 2006), of internal email communication of OSA BDs (by at least one of the three dissenting BDs) does suggest strongly that there is political polarization among the OSA BDs.d. Dheressa et al. (2006), despite claiming to be disinterested parties, are in fact strongly prejudiced (on grounds of political view) against Oboo Leenco Latta and, in the words of the authors, against the two "top OSA officers".

According to (Jeffrey 1997) "The Applicable [United States] Federal Rules of Evidence": Rule 403 … governs relevance [of evidence] and notes that if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, then the court may exclude the evidence". Before reaching a determination, on the admissibility of the evidence brought by Dheressa et al. (2006) on grounds of the existence of prejudice, it would be prudent to examine the objectivity of the decision process followed by all OSA BDs in the selection of the awardees.

Scenario One:

There was a decision-making system that guarded against prejudice (in the selection of awardees). This means that while the divulgence of internal OSA BDs' communication to non-OSA BD 'clandestinely' may show political bias, given that the decision it self was reached objectively, the prejudice may not be strong enough to outweigh "… the probative value of the evidence". In this case, the evidence is admissible.

Scenario Two:

The decision-making system (that resulted in the selection of OSA awardees) was not strong enough to guard against prejudice. This means that all the OSA BDs used, to a significant degree, a subjective judgment in determining who the awardees should be. Under this scenario, it is impossible to satisfy that none of the six BDs used political bias to reach a decision on who should be selected for the award. The combination of prejudiced decision-making and unauthorized divulgence of internal BDs' communication to parties who have a political stake in the BDs' decision makes the prejudice "… strong enough to outweigh … the probative value of the evidence". Under this scenario the evidence cannot be admissible.

Test for scenario one and scenario two

>From the evidence presented by Dheressa et al. (2006), it is clear that >the'majority vote approach' taken by the OSA 'BDs to select the awardees used subjective assessment of objective merits (of the candidates) rather than objective assessment of objective merits. For example, the evidentiary emails (see attachments of Dheressa et al. 2006) that the authors provided demonstrates that the BDs did not use any weighting system to arrive at the decisions they made. Rather than using objective criteria such as: 1) number of journal articles published by the candidates; 2) number of books published; 3) the candidate's contribution to political program/policy/strategy; the BDs seemed to have reached the decisions that they did based on subjective assessments of the candidates' objective contribution to the Oromo people. The system used by the BDs under this scenario could not have been strong enough to guard against political prejudice (i.e., whether for or against the candidates). The passionate pursuit against the selection of Oboo Leenco Latta, in fact, shows that the selection process it self was marred by political prejudice. Consequently, the test of the evidence on all grounds: 1) decision-making motivated by political interest; 2) prejudiced divulgence of internal information to parties that have a political stake in the OSA BDs decision, including in the matters being pursued, and; 3) a clear absence of a system that would have guarded against prejudiced decision-making shows that the "… prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence". Given the above findings, admitting the evidence compromises the case against the accused. Without the evidence, there is no case against the accused. If you cannot convict, you have to acquit.

IV. What is at stake?

There are profound issues at stake by proceeding with the current feud on a public forum over the sanctity of our nation's professional association. You only have to read Mr. Abraham Dalu's email (see Oromianet-d Digest Volume 2006: Issue 656). To establish the credentials that legitimize his assessment of OSA, Mr. Dalu wrote that he is "… a member of numerous scholarly organizations, and [has] also served as an officer or committee chairman in few of them". He then stated that if he was allowed "… to compare OSA to one of those organizations, [he] would give OSA an 'F' grade". With all due respect to the learned Oromo, perhaps it is his aptitude to work productively and consistently in an environment where there are obvious differences that he should assess and determine whether, in all fairness, he is worth more than the very grade that he would have assigned to OSA. With this necessary remark out of the way, I now wish to concentrate on the profound issues that are at stake.

The Oromo Studies Association, as we all know is a monumental Oromo institution that serves both as a symbol of national pride and as a dynamic institution engaged, against all odds, in contemporary academic inquiry. The association is a symbol of not only of national pride but is also of our disposition to work together as a people. It is that is at stake principally. It is this that we should guard against, at all cost, including when the price is a pain of resistance to score points.

Call for a commonsense to prevail

It would be naive to expect that political polarization among the Diaspora Oromo shall recede any time soon. Political polarization shall continue to exist for as long as differences of political views exist. Political polarization, if we tap into its positive forces, can be the fountain of new ideas. In order to benefit from such a conceptual resource, however, we should be beware of the 'winner takes it all' mentality; we should allow others adequate latitude. Let us thus stop public feuding over the OSA. Let us engage commonsense in dealing with the matter.

V. What should be done?

Some of the substantive matters presented by Dheressa et al. 2006 require sober investigation. Some of these include:
a. allegations that the OSA was populated with a period of two days with an intent to maximize votes
b. Voting rights of the ex officio member. Ex-officio is a Latin terminology which means 'by virtue of her/his office'. The term does not of it self deny the member holding this office her/his rights to vote. In fact, unless the association's constitution specifically states otherwise an ex-officio member enjoys full voting rights. What are the OSA's constitutional provisions for this?
c. Election of Mr. Asoba in absentia: what are the provisions of the OSA constitution on this? Why did the OSA BD (even if the Chairperson, as claimed, withheld the information) wait for almost 11 months before it raised this matter? Or is simply a foul cry?We must remember that even if the above substantive matters were to be found to have been breached, the whole issue needs to take account of the underlying more sinister force - the interaction of political polarization and 'the winner takes it all' contest among the OSA Executive/BDs.

What is the best course of action?

Mediation is the only way to go about it. Allow me to quote again Crick (1990:269), who noted: "My moral is not peace at any price but the terribly high price and unpredictability of victory if it comes to winner takes it all."

VI. Conclusion

In this paper I was motivated principally by the objective of introducing reality lenses to the series of emails that the paper authored by Dheressa et al. (2006) has provoked from a number of Oromos recently. The evidence presented by Dheressa et al. (2006) accused two top Oromo scholars whose characters and credentials portray national pride for the Oromo masses.

It is often very easy to fall into the trap by accepting evidences without scrutiny. Such gullible reaction to matters of national interest, beyond failing to solve it, escalates conflicts further. The more responsible approach thus becomes examination of the cases within the broader contexts. The current episode of the OSA is explained more accurately by the political polarization that has infested the Diaspora Oromo's struggle for political self-determination of the Oromo people. The paper argued that whilst the institution OSA may exist outside political polarization, the officers that serve the organization (including its members) cannot be expected to be completely value-free about the political dynamic that affects their nation. Given this conclusion, the paper found that it is imprudent to deduce, beyond reasonable doubt, that OSA BDs who were opposed to the selection of Oboo Leenco Latta and Dheressa et al. (2006) (who presented the charge to the public court), at least at the time of making their decision, were completely value-free about the political views held by the candidate. The paper also argued that, without appropriate explanation coming forth, it is imprudent conclude that the three BDs did not collude to maximize their political interest. The paper found it interesting that Dheressa et al. (2006) would submit evidentiary materials (that are otherwise internal OSA BD documents) on a public forum but would not provide any comments as to the legality of the mechanism that they followed in accessing the documents. In the absence of such explanation, the paper found that it is plausible to conclude that politically-motivated collusion has taken place between the three BDs (that objected to the selection of Oboo Leenco Latta) and Dheressa et al. (2006). In an effort to investigate this assumption, the paper tested the language of Dheressa et al. (2006) for political prejudice and found that some of the languages used by the authors (in the construction of their evidence) indeed portray overt prejudice against the decision of the two BDs that they accused. The paper concluded that what is at play in the current OSA episode is the mixture of intra-group and voter political polarization with the 'winner takes it all' contest.

Prejudice is one of the primary factors that compromise the admissibility of evidence. In the face of compelling prejudice, the paper found that it was prudent to examine whether or not the evidence brought against the accused by Dheressa et al. (2006) was admissible. The finding showed that the nature of the prejudice was so strong that it outweighs substantially "… the probative value of the evidence". The paper concluded that, given the absence of a rigorous system to guard against prejudicial decision-making by the BDs, and given the inadmissibility of the evidence presented by Dheressa et al. (2006), it was prudent to recommend that the accused be acquitted.

The paper argued that the need for a militant call for reform needs to be balanced between the extent of systemic failure, on the one hand, and the extent to which the ensuing process impacts public interest, on the other. To the extent that this balance needs to be maintained, the paper found that the selection of jurisdiction for adjudication of the competing views and the language used for construction of the evidence are critical. Observing that what is at stake is more profound than even the institution OSA, the paper recommended that the best course of action, along with sober investigation of the substantive matters raised by Dheressa et al. (2006), was mediation.

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