Somalia Back to War
New Vision (Kampala)
March 18, 2007
By Gwynne Dyer
Kampala
Through sixteen years of violent anarchy, most of Mogadishu's population stayed
put, but in the past few weeks tens of thousands have fled. Since Ethiopian
troops installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the city in late
December, the Somali capital's brief interval of peace and security has given
way to renewed fighting, with the Ethiopian invaders replying to mortar attacks
on their bases with indiscriminate artillery fire in the middle of the city.
Almost all Somalis see Ethiopia as their country's main enemy, and behind the
Ethiopians they see the United States. So when the Union of Islamic Courts that
restored peace to the ruined city last June was forced to flee in late December,
and US aircraft attacked retreating UIC fighters (targeting suspected al-Qaeda
members, they claimed), resistance was inevitable.
The attacks on the Ethiopians by various Somali factions, some linked to the
Islamic Courts and some to local warlords who returned to the city after the
UIC was chased out, have grown so frequent that most of the TFG's members have
withdrawn from Mogadishu back to Baidoa, their former "provisional capital."
The plan was to replace Ethiopian troops with a multi-national African Union
force as soon as possible, but the first Ugandan soldiers to arrive in Mogadishu
on March 6, immediately came under fire as well.
Like his father before him, President George W. Bush has authorised a military
intervention in Somalia, and once again it will end in tears. But there are
two differences this time: the younger Bush is committing no American troops,
and there are none of the genuinely humanitarian intentions that motivated the
1992 intervention. It's just a question of making sure that "our guy"
runs Somalia.
"Our guy," in this case, is Abdullahi Yusuf, one of the many warlords
to rise out of the chaos that has been Somalia for the past sixteen years. He
has long been close to the Ethiopians, the only US ally in the Horn of Africa,
and in 2004, he was chosen as president of the TFG by a Somali "parliament"
meeting in Kenya and composed mainly of other warlords or their representatives.
While Washington approved of the choice, at that point it did not put much effort
into helping Abdullahi Yusuf take control of Somalia.
That all changed after June, 2006, when a US-backed operation by two warlords
in Mogadishu, intended to capture three men suspected of planning the attacks
on US embassies in East Africa in 1998, went badly wrong. The men were not captured
- and the incident triggered a non-violent popular uprising that chased all
the warlords and their troops from the city.
The organising force behind the popular uprising was the Union of Islamic Courts.
Funded by local merchants in the hope that they could reduce the constant robberies
and kidnaps that made it almost impossible to do business, the Islamic Courts
quickly grew into a mass movement that embodied the longing of ordinary Somalis
for an end to the violence. The peace they brought to Mogadishu soon spread
over most of southern Somalia.
It was Somalis settling their own problems - just what all the foreigners had
been urging them to do for so long - but unfortunately they had come up with
the wrong answer: the courts were "Islamic" and they wanted to enforce
Sharia law. How else you might persuade Somalis to rise above their divisive
clan loyalties, apart for appealing to their shared religious values, was not
explained, but this solution was clearly unacceptable to the United States.
As an amorphous popular movement, the UIC had no control over its more loud-mouthed
supporters, some of whom prattled freely about unifying all Somali-inhabited
areas (which would mean invading Djibouti, northern Kenya, and much of eastern
Ethiopia). Some very stupid UIC members even insisted on sheltering the three
(non-Somali) men whom the United States wanted in connection with the 1998 embassy
attacks. But the UIC was not a "terrorist organisation," and it gave
southern Somalia six months of peace.
That's over now. Since the Ethiopians took Mogadishu, the violence has returned
worse than ever, with warlords fighting each other to re-establish their turf
and everybody having a crack at the hated Ethiopians - who respond with artillery
fire. The peace is a memory and the notion that a few thousand African Union
peacekeepers are going to recreate it is a fantasy. (Besides, half of the promised
8,000 AU troops have yet to be volunteered.)
If Abdullahi Yusuf could bring peace to Somalia, with or without the collaboration
of his fellow warlords, it would be a lot better than the chaos that prevailed
a year ago. But it is very unlikely that he can do that whether the Ethiopian
troops go home or not - and it is quite likely that they will go home soon,
precisely because that would maximise the chaos. Ethiopia doesn't want to occupy
Somalia permanently; it just wants to cripple it.
The Islamic Courts will go on fighting the Ethiopians, Abdullahi Yusuf and the
other warlords, but they risk becoming just one more contender in the unending,
multi-sided battle for control of Somalia. They were the country's best chance
for an end to the killing, but their moment has probably passed.